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udging by the amount of scholarly literature dedicated 
to each, Schopenhauer is considered less important than 
Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.  The majority of secondary 
literature either focuses on his relation to a more promi-
nent figure or criticizes his system for not being internal-
ly harmonious.  In this paper I intend to examine three critiques 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, each of which claims that his phi-
losophy is not internally consistent.  Throughout this paper I will 
refer to the three problems as the knowledge problem, the nihil-
ism problem, and the incoherency problem.  While examining 
these critiques, I will use Indic philosophy to help revive Scho-
penhauer’s system.  All three of these critiques are in some way 
related to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic contemplation, and within 
Indic thought an analogue is found in meditation.  Throughout 
this paper, these two types of meditation will be used as a refer-
ence point.  
Before addressing the knowledge problem, a preliminary 
note is needed.  Indic philosophy is almost as diverse as the 
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western philosophical tradition.  When I speak of Indic philoso-
phy, I will be referring to the school known as Advaita Vedanta, or 
non-dualist Vedanta.  Vedanta is one of the six orthodox schools 
in ancient Indic philosophy,1 and advaita is one of its sects.2 
Among these schools there circulated a standard body of texts,3 
some of which were more closely associated with one school 
than with others.  For instance, a book like the Yoga Sutras was 
closely tied to the Yoga school, yet all of the schools used and 
developed a commentarial tradition on the text.  Thus, when I 
speak of an Indic concept my point of view will be that of the 
non-dualist Vedantins.  The tenets of this school will become 
clear throughout this paper, although it should be remembered 
that my goal here is not to elucidate the similarities or differences 
between Schopenhauer and Vedanta.  The task at hand is to use 
Vedanta to help ward off the attacks made against Schopenhau-
er. 
The first problem I call “the knowledge problem.”  Before I 
begin examining the problem, it will be useful to discuss Scho-
penhauer’s view of knowledge.  The groundwork for Schopen-
hauer’s epistemology was laid by Kant.  Thus for Schopenhauer, 
space and time are merely intuitions of the mind, while causality 
is one of the manifestations of the principle of sufficient reason.4  
This principle states that any representation can be explained by 
reference to a separate or preceding representation, just as classi-
cal physics tells us.  As a result of this, reason and all of its con-
cepts are valid only in relation to experience, which necessarily 
takes place in space and time.  Except for a special experience 
called “aesthetic contemplation,” everything in the phenomenal 
world is guided by principle of sufficient reason, which for our 
purposes is simply causality.  The principle of sufficient reason is 
completely deterministic.  It holds necessarily and absolutely de-
termines the way in which the world changes. 
Aesthetic contemplation is an experience during which we 
gaze not just on an object, but upon its Form or Idea understood 
in the Platonic sense.  Schopenhauer calls the Platonic Ideas the 
adequate objectification of the will.5 As such, they are the inter-
mediary between the fluctuating world of sense-perception and 
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from the will by virtue of being differentiated from each other.  
As a result of this, the objects of aesthetic contemplation are dif-
ferent from the objects of everyday sense-perception and require 
a different mode of epistemological access.  Schopenhauer says, 
“if the Ideas are to become [the] object of knowledge, this can 
happen only by abolishing individuality in the knowing sub-
ject.”7  In other words, a corresponding change---—from individ-
uated to non-individuated—must be found in both subject and 
object if the latter is to be known by the former.   
Keeping that preface in mind, we can now state the 
knowledge problem:  How can a human being, whose brain and 
perceptive faculties fall under the principle of sufficient reason, 
grasp the Platonic Forms, which do not fall under the principle of 
sufficient reason?  While introducing the will as the thing-in-
itself, Schopenhauer says, “besides the will and the representa-
tion there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable to us.”8  
The Platonic Ideas lie in a vague area that is still representation, 
yet they lie closer to the will than sense-perception.  In some 
way, then, there must be a continuum from the most concentrat-
ed and unwavering aesthetic experience of a Platonic Idea to the 
most etiological and causally focused awareness of a particular 
object.  Perhaps, if we can find a correlating continuum of states 
from the side of the subject, we can dissolve the knowledge prob-
lem by saying that aesthetic contemplation lies on one extreme of 
the epistemological spectrum.  Schopenhauer does indeed give 
us such a description.  He says, “our consciousness has two 
sides; in part it is consciousness of our own selves, which is will, 
and in part consciousness of other things.”9  He also says that, 
“apprehension of the Idea. . .springs only from a temporary pre-
ponderance of the intellect over the Will, or, physiologically con-
sidered, from a strong excitation of the brain’s perceptive activi-
ty, without any excitation of inclinations or emotions.”10  It 
should be kept in mind here that each person’s body is simulta-
neously will and representation of will.11  We can now see the 
corresponding continuum from both the sides of object and sub-
ject.  When we are contemplating a Platonic Form, our conscious-
ness is focused exclusively on the object of perception and not on 
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the object’s relation to our will.  When we are on the other side of 
the epistemological extreme we are focused on causality insofar 
as it will help us satisfy a desire.  For instance, I can stare at a so-
da machine and look at it in two different ways.  I can contem-
plate the properties of plasticity, electricity, and gravity in an at-
tempt to understand the nature of the things I see, or I can focus 
on the causal mechanisms which will result in me obtaining a 
soda (feeding in a quarter, pushing the button, electrical pulses 
being sent to the mechanism which drops the soda out of the 
slot, etc).  According to this explanation, de-individuated 
knowledge comes about when we reside on one extreme of the 
continuum.12   
This answer does not seem completely satisfactory.  First, the 
principle of sufficient reason does not lie on a continuum.  It ei-
ther applies or it does not.  Secondly, the innermost nature of all 
things is will.  Where intellect or knowledge appears, it appears 
as a servant to the will.13 Even when the intellect has a 
“temporary preponderance” over the will, as is the case during 
aesthetic contemplation, the will is still there.  It seems question-
able to cite the brain’s activity as the means by which we forget 
our will.  By doing this, Schopenhauer seems to go against his 
earlier claim that the body is the will.  He says, “the act of the 
will and the action of the body are not two different states. . . but 
are one and the same thing. . . This applies to every movement of 
the body. . . [including] involuntary movement following on 
mere stimuli.”14  The neurological processes that occur in the 
brain during perception are an example of “involuntary move-
ment following on mere stimuli.”  It is unknown how a process 
falling under the control of the principle of sufficient reason 
could produce an experience that does not.  Schopenhauer says 
that in humans, the intellect has the unique power to overthrow 
its master, the will,15 but he does not explain how this is possible.  
If the continuum suggested earlier is accurate, then Schopenhau-
er seemingly cannot account for this phenomenon.  Knowledge 
that falls outside of the principle of sufficient reason should not 
lie on the continuum; it should be a further leap past the most 
concentrated and non-causally focused concentration.  Because 
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knowledge arises out of the will, will-less knowledge seems im-
possible.  For the object to remain while the will vanishes is in-
conceivable: it is as if one removes the premises and still expects 
the conclusion.   
This problem rises not because contemplative experience is 
unbelievable, but because Schopenhauer’s metaphysics do not 
logically allow for it.  Within the Indic tradition, we see a practice 
nearly identical to aesthetic contemplation: meditation.  These 
two activities are curiously similar.  According to the Yoga Su-
tras, there are eight “limbs” of yoga.16  Of these eight limbs or 
steps, the last four deal with varying stages of meditation.  In as-
cending order, they are: disengagement of the senses, concentra-
tion, meditation, and absorption.  These four states roughly cor-
respond to the continuum we saw earlier, where one begins by 
viewing the world as a conglomeration of objects meant to please 
the senses.  The stage in which we disengage the senses is some-
where in the middle of the spectrum where we try to stop desir-
ing.  Concentration and meditation may be seen as varying de-
grees of mental focus.  Eventually, one views objects not as possi-
ble ways of satisfying the senses, but as objects upon which to 
meditate.  The final stage of meditation, called absorption or Sa-
madhi, is further split up into five subcategories.  The first two 
seem to have direct overlap with aesthetic contemplation.  Ac-
cording to the first traditional commentator of the Sutras, Vyasa, 
the first of these stages involves taking up an object with com-
plete focus.17  Naturally, this would involve not letting one’s self 
desire or want the object upon which one is meditating.  The sec-
ond stage, according to various commentators, is when we see 
the “subtle elements” of the object previously meditated upon.  
Within Indic physics, the subtle elements of all material things 
are called gunas.  They are the three basic constituents of all ma-
terial and mental bodies, and also have a quality associated with 
them.  The three gunas—sattva, rajas, and tamas—are associated 
with the qualities of lucidity, activity, and heaviness.  The differ-
ences in objects that we encounter in the world arise because of 
differing constituents and different ratios of the gunas.  The natu-
ral disposition of objects to behave in a certain way arises from 
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the gunal composition of the thing.    
We have shown that there exists a parallel between the two 
types of contemplation.  In Schopenhauer’s version we see the 
inner nature of a thing as will; we notice the way in which all 
things move, desire, or tend to a certain behavior that is natural 
to its kind.  Similarly, when contemplating the gunas or subtle 
elements of a thing, we are focusing on the three elements of ma-
terial nature that are responsible for the natures and movements 
of all things.  It is not at all a stretch of the imagination to equate 
these two contemplative states.18  The difference is that in the In-
dic tradition this is not the final stage of contemplation.  Accord-
ing to some commentators of the Yoga Sutras,19 the third stage 
involves contemplating thoughts and the sense organs them-
selves, while the fourth stage has the most basic part of the mind 
as its object.20  The fifth and final stage is when the soul or atman 
becomes fully aware of itself.  
The metaphysical differences between Schopenhauer and the 
Vedantins have now become evident.  Schopenhauer says that 
the will, which has “striving [as] its sole nature,” is the nature of 
all phenomena.21  The Vedantins claim that the core of every liv-
ing being is an atman, which is variously identified as the “ear of 
the ear; . . . the eye of the eye,”22 or the “unthought thinker; the 
unknown knower.”23  In short, the atman is consciousness.  All 
psychical activity, however, is a product of the three gunas, 
which together are called prakriti.  But the atman may not be 
pure consciousness.  In the Kena Upanishad we see a student ask 
his guru, “Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards 
its object?”24  The answer to this is the entity which is described 
as the ‘ear of the ear; . . . the eye of the eye.’  Although the main 
power of this atman is consciousness, it is plausible to locate 
some sort of agency in the atman itself, as the Brahma Sutras do 
explicitly.25   
It appears that we may have found a solution to Schopenhau-
er’s knowledge problem.  If Schopenhauer were to admit two 
things, he could solve the knowledge problem. First, if he were to 
admit that the fundamental part of a sentient being is the foun-
dation of consciousness, he would be able to account for 
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knowledge.  More specifically, he could account for de-
individuated experience, because the knowing entity does not 
fall under the rule of the principle of sufficient reason.  It is im-
material, and according to the Vedantins, it is the same in every 
conscious being.26  This gives the inner-most self an ontological 
status identical to the Platonic forms.  It also still allows for nor-
mal perception.  The brain and body still operate according to 
the principle of sufficient reason, and normal perception occurs 
when the atman is conscious of the brain’s activity.   Schopen-
hauer can also still maintain that all things, with the exception of 
the inner-most self, have will or striving as their essence, because 
this striving and will only manifests itself in the gunas, which are 
distinct from the atman.  An entity that has the fundamental na-
ture of receptivity does not will in the way Schopenhauer claims 
it does, but all of its gunally composed objects do.  Schopenhauer 
can still maintain that the body is nothing but the will, because 
the atman is wholly different from the body.  All willing and 
striving does arise from the body, but the body is not the same as 
our inner-most self.  The second thing he must give up is the im-
plicit claim that consciousness arises from the brain.  Schopen-
hauer never talks about the nature of consciousness directly, but 
he counts it among the powers of the intellect, often using 
‘consciousness’ as a synonym for ‘perception’ or ‘abstract aware-
ness.’27  If Schopenhauer were to admit that consciousness is dif-
ferent from intellect, he could still maintain that the entire world 
of representation has the nature of will. Since Schopenhauer is a 
transcendental idealist, he maintains that the intellect produces 
matter and, therefore, will. 
The second problem is called “the nihilism problem,” and it 
deals with the aim of ethics.  Upon having an experience of aes-
thetic contemplation one sees that the innermost nature of all 
things is will, and then strives to silence it.28  In the concluding 
chapter of the World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer 
speaks of “deliverance from a world whose whole existence pre-
sented itself to us as suffering.”29  For Schopenhauer, the will is 
nothing but unsatisfied desire and suffering.30  Unfortunately, 
Schopenhauer also says that the “human will is always directed 
Three Criticisms of Schopenhauer 27 
to its own well-being, which in sum is comprehended under the 
concept happiness.”31  If we are to stop suffering, then we must 
stop the search for happiness.  This is a fundamental point in 
Schopenhauer’s ethics.  Schopenhauer uses the phrase “denial of 
the will-to live,” or “mortification of the will” to refer to this be-
havior.32  The problem is that by denying the will-to-live, one de-
nies reality.  To phrase this more strongly, one may say that 
Schopenhauer has as his goal the denial of what is most funda-
mental and real, in favor of nothingness.33  Although this is not a 
logical problem, it is intuitive that denying the foundations of 
reality is in someway mistaken, although Schopenhauer would 
claim that our intuitions merely support his theory of the will-to-
live. 
Foreseeing this objection, Schopenhauer says that the concept 
of nothingness is essentially relative and dependant on one’s 
point of view.  For instance, when doing arithmetic one can make 
a negative number positive by adding a second negative sign. 
This reversal of qualities is possible only because negativity, and 
by extension the concept of nothingness, are relative concepts.  
Because nothingness is a relative term, “absolute nothingness” 
has no meaning.  It is an incoherent concept.  Human beings are 
phenomena of the Platonic Form “human.”  As such, we are the 
objectified will-to-live.  From our point of view, denying the will 
“appears . . . as a transition into empty nothingness.”34  From a 
different point of view it would appear as the best of all possible 
transitions.  According to Schopenhauer, this transition into 
nothingness is what superstitious dogmatists variously call 
“ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so on.”35  
The problem with this view is that there can be no other point of 
view than the one we have.  The will is the sole existent.  The on-
ly other fathomable point of view is that of non-existence, and 
that is by definition not a point of view.  If the will is fundamen-
tal, as Schopenhauer claims, his ethics necessarily amount to a 
denial of reality, which always appears to us as something bad. 
The Vedantin philosopher will also admit that “[f]or one who 
has discrimination, everything is suffering.”36  In this phrase, the 
word “everything” means “everything physical,” or “everything 
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that is prakritic.”37  The equivalent to “prakriti” in Schopenhau-
er’s thought is “representation.”  The difference is that represen-
tation is will (the cause of suffering).  For the Vedantin, prakriti is 
the cause of suffering.  It is either fundamentally separate from 
the atman, or connected with it in virtue of being derived from 
the same source.38  This is important, because the Vedantins will 
only admit that all of life is suffering, so long as it is viewed in a 
certain way.  But they will deny that Brahman, the ultimate 
source of everything, is the cause of suffering.  Rather, the cause 
is misidentifying our true selves with our bodies and minds, 
which is precisely what Schopenhauer does.  It is the nature of 
prakriti to change, deteriorate, and eventually annihilate every-
thing it brings forth.39  As Schopenhauer correctly points out, it is 
the will’s essential nature to strive against and consume itself.40  
Like the knowledge problem, Schopenhauer can still hold the 
belief that the body is the will, but he cannot maintain that the 
will is the most fundamental nature of our selves.  If he were 
willing to admit that at our core was a conscious being, he could 
still maintain the transient and painful nature of all representa-
tion and not be accused of denying reality.  From this new per-
spective, suffering arises from a misidentification of the body 
with the self, not from the inner-most nature of reality.41 
The last problem arises not while looking at the goals of 
Schopenhauer’s ethics, but while examining the feasibility of put-
ting them into practice.  I call this “the incoherency problem,” 
and it relates to “the nihilism problem” in that it is an attempt to 
carry out the actions learned from contemplation.  The issue is 
whether it is possible to silence the will without willing in the 
process.42  In describing ethics and ethical living, Schopenhauer 
presents a three tiered account: the first and second are found in 
the essay On the basis of Morals, while the third is in the final 
chapter of The World as Will.  The first stage of ethical action is 
negative, while the second is positive.  In the negative account 
Schopenhauer describes the virtue of justice.  Justice is that 
which “steps before me, checking the inherent anti-moral powers 
in me, as a result of which I cause others to suffer, calling me to 
‘stop!’”43  The second stage, which is positive, is called loving 
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kindness.  Schopenhauer says that loving kindness “does not just 
restrain me from hurting another, but even impels me to help 
him.”44  These virtues both arise out of compassion, which is the 
immediate identification of, and participation in, another’s suf-
fering.45  The third step is again negative, and one no longer acts 
out of compassion or virtue.  In The World as Will, Schopenhauer 
says that when a person “recognizes the true nature of things-in-
themselves, and thus the whole, [he] is no longer susceptible [to] 
such consolation. . .  The phenomenon by which this becomes 
manifest is the transition from virtue to asceticism.”46  The ascetic 
is the human who “ceases to will anything.”47 
At this point we may ask whether this view is logically con-
sistent.  Every action and movement of the body is an action of 
the will.  This must be the case with the lack of action as well.  To 
examine this more closely we may enquire into suicide, of which 
Schopenhauer often speaks.48  Generally, Schopenhauer is 
against suicide.  He says that it is a misguided attempt to silence 
the will that ultimately fails.  Suicide is a manifestation of the dis-
satisfaction with one’s particular condition, and not with life it-
self.49  There is a special type of suicide, however, that is the ut-
most extreme of asceticism: starvation.50  All other suicides at-
tempt to eliminate suffering by cutting life short.  In this case 
however, the suffering is prolonged, and the will does not affirm 
itself by eliminating the pain involved in life.  The difference be-
tween these two situations seems harder to distinguish than 
Schopenhauer supposes.  If an action takes severe discipline or if 
the results are painful, then it is an act of the will to refrain from 
responding.  It could not be otherwise.  If it were, we might ask, 
what is causing you to not will?  The will causes one to not will, 
or as Nietzsche puts it, to will nothingness.  At this point, Scho-
penhauer might object that to cease acting is to cease willing: The 
body is the will, but only its movements are willed.  You do not 
will yourself to stay motionless during a deep sleep, he might 
say.  To this one could respond by pointing to pleasure and pain.  
It is true that our bodies can be at rest without it being willed.  
An ascetic’s body, however, incurs great hardship and pain.  Ac-
cording to Schopenhauer, “it is called pain when it is contrary to 
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the will.”51  It is our own will that prevents us from acting out 
against this pain.  We can see this from the nature of will itself.  
When explaining the way in which the Forms take hold of mat-
ter, Schopenhauer states that higher and more complex Forms do 
not exterminate the lower, but appropriate them.  For example, 
the human Form appropriates crystallization in bone formation, 
electricity in the brain, and chemical separation in the stomach.  
He makes it clear that the higher are not epiphenomena reduci-
ble to the lower; but the higher, “swallowing up all of them,” ap-
propriate the lower, for “variance with itself [is] essential to the 
will . . . each wishes to reveal its own Idea.”52  The will’s essential 
nature is to strive against itself, as Schopenhauer puts it, “the 
will-to-live generally feasts on itself.”53  Thus, we must admit 
that the inner struggle one feels as an ascetic is a perfect mirror-
ing of the will’s essential nature which was supposed to be elimi-
nated through asceticism.     
To solve this problem, one must remember a distinction that 
was suggested when examining the knowledge problem.  Ac-
cording to the Brahma Sutras and the Kena Upanishad, the at-
man has some sort of agency.  This agency must be sharply dis-
tinguished from want or desire.  Although this issue has not been 
developed well within the Indic tradition,54 there are some prob-
lems with attributing agency purely to the mind.  If the mind is 
the thing that works for liberation, then it is the thing liberated. 
The atman was never deluded in the first place, and enlighten-
ment has nothing to do with the atman.  In this case the atman 
would be the eternally “detached witness”55 that passively 
watches the mind free itself of ignorance.  A similar argument 
states that if the body had agency within it, the atman would 
again be stuck as a passive witness to a body which freed itself 
by its own agency. 
If Schopenhauer were to accept that will lies in the body and 
in the material universe, but that the inner-most self retains some 
amount of agency, he would not have the incoherency problem.  
If the self has agency, then self-denial is not the contradictory self
-reflexivity it appears to be for Schopenhauer.  Instead, it is a hi-
erarchical ordering that is initiated by the inner-most self.  In this 
Three Criticisms of Schopenhauer 31 
situation Schopenhauer could retain his beliefs about the free-
dom of the will and the deterministic nature of the material 
world.  The self, which has agency, is totally free to make deci-
sions.  All motives and influences, however, are bound up with 
the deterministically bound body.  Only when a person has en-
countered certain ideas and experiences will that person be capa-
ble of choosing the path of philosophical enlightenment, or for 
that matter, any other path.  This seems to be what we encounter 
in the world.  It takes a certain disposition and set of experiences 
to embrace any particular life. 
To conclude, I will summarize the solutions and amendments 
which I recommend Schopenhauer accept if he is to avoid the 
aforementioned problems.  If Schopenhauer accepts the follow-
ing propositions, he will not run into the problems he does: 1) 
The inner-most self has consciousness. 2) Consciousness is differ-
ent, and more fundamental than, the intellect. 3) The self has a 
type of basic agency which is different from wants and desires.  
By accepting these three propositions, Schopenhauer can main-
tain a whole host of his beliefs which include, but are not limited 
to: atheism, the priority of first hand experience in metaphysics, 
the painful and transient nature of the material world, the free-
dom of self, the determinacy of the world, the legitimacy and re-
ality of aesthetic contemplation, and finally the mystical belief in 
the one-ness of all beings.  It is my belief that with these changes, 
the essential characteristics of Schopenhauer’s philosophy are 
still preserved.  Among modern philosophers, Schopenhauer is 
the black sheep of the flock.  His metaphysical system has more 
in common with the ancients than any does any other system 
from the modern period.  As has been demonstrated, Schopen-
hauer can retain many of his essential beliefs even after these 
changes.  Although this paper is not the place to do so, it seems 
appropriate that the next step for an admirer of Schopenhauer 
would be to look into Schopenhauer’s influences. By doing this 
one could determine the specific beliefs and concepts which lead 
Schopenhauer into holding problematic doctrines.56  The natural 
place to look would be in Kant, whose books greatly influenced 
Schopenhauer’s views on consciousness and intellect.  By exam-
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ining these three problems and suggesting further work to be 
done, I have hoped to contribute not only to the legitimacy of 
Schopenhauer as a philosopher; but also to the Vedanta tradition 
which, though quite similar to many western philosophies, is 
often not studied by western philosophers.  Schopenhauer and 
the Vedantins both have many merits which are often over-
looked.  By conducting research into these two philosophical sys-
tems I am attempting to display the merits and spread awareness 
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